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Testimonial Deception by Police: 
An Ethical Analysis 
John Kleinig 
In 1 96 1 ,  the United States Supreme Court hdd that "all evidence 
obtained by searches and sei:ures in violation of the Constitution is, 
by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court. " 1 No longer was 
it sufficient for state courts to concern themselves only with the 
"competence" of the evidence presented to them; they now had to 
consider whether it had been properly obtained. Although the 
Supreme Court was only applying in the state sphere what had already 
applied in the federal sphere, the decision was believed by many to 
have profound implications for law enforcement. Most criminal 
charges are heard in state courts, and the ruling placed in jeopardy 
investigative practices that had been considered essential to police 
work. 
In 1966, the Supreme Court once again constrained law enforce­
ment practices by extending the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination to custodial interrogation. Police officers were 
required to inform arrested persons that they had a right to remain 
silent, that any statements they made could be used as evidence, that 
they had a right to an attorney, and that an attorney would be pro­
vided if it was not possible for them to afford onc.2 Thus were certain 
ways of inducing confessions or securing evidence rendered unaccep­
table. Here too the effects were thought to be profound. A strategic 
edge had been lost in the war against crime. 
Following these two decisions - and others made subsequent to 
them - there were dire predictions about the future of the criminal 
justice system. It is not obvious that these predictions have come true. 
Or, to the extent that they have come true, it is not clear that the 
1 961 Mapp and 1966 Miranda decisions have been major contribu­
tors. Why not? I guess one answer is that police have found other 
ways of doing their work effectively. And I have no doubt that that is 
part of the explanation. But another part of the explanation is that 
some of the old practices persist, albeit more "discreetly." 
In studies conducted after the Mapp decision, it was found that the 
evidential grounds for misdemeanor narcotics charges altered dramat­
ically.3 According to one of those studies, in 67% of 1 32 cases that 
came to court shortly before Mapp, narcotics were said to have been 
found hidden on the defendant's person. In the remaining 33% of 
cases, the defendant was said to have dropped the narcotics or thrown 
them to the ground. Of 97 cases prosecuted in a comparable period 
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after Mapp, it was claimed in only 16 .5% of cases that narcotics had 
been found on the person; in the remaining 83.5% of cases it was 
asserted that narcotics had been dropped or thrown to the ground. 
Are we to explain this reversal by a change in the practices of those in 
possession of n.arcotics.i or is it more likely that investigating officers, 
now aware of the constraints placed 0111 them by Mapp. tailored their 
testimony to conform to legal requirements? "Dropsy" testimony, as 
it came to be known, enabled law enforcement officers to perpetuate 
some of the search and seizure practices that Mapp had outlawed. 
Practices employed to search premises and seize incriminating items 
were also affected by the Mapp decision. Entering closed and private 
premises without permission or a warrant violates the constitutional 
right to privacy. Following Mapp, investigating officers asserted with 
increasing frequency that they had simply happened by the premises 
in question, that the door was open or that it was voluntarily opened 
to them, and that the incriminating evidence was in .. plain view." 
Though this was always possible, in many cases it was unlikely. Evi­
dence was being reconstructed to conform to legat requirements. s 
What is true of search and seizure is also true of interrogatory prac­
tices. Subsequent to the Miranda decision, investigating officers would 
claim that confessing suspects had been read their Miranda 
rights when in custody or that statements made without the benefit of 
the Miranda warnings had been made non-custodially. Yet those 
involved in the criminal justice process knew that on some occasions, 
at least, such assertions were unlikely to be true, or if true, concealed 
deficiencies in implementation . However, establishing this without 
disadvantage to defendants was difficult, since suppression hearings 
would offer an opportunity for damaging cross-examination, and so 
such breaches generally went unchallenged.6 
These examples of testimonial deception are intended to be only 
illustrative. They do not exhaust the field. Nor do I wish to suggest 
that the practices outlined occur as frequently now as when the early 
studies were conducted. A later generation of police officers, trained 
in post-Mapp and post-Miranda techniques, may be more willing 
(albeit grudgingly) to adhere to their strictures. 
II 
Deception is not uncommon in police work. Indeed it is usually 
argued to be not only indispensable to effective law enforcement but 
also justifiable . At both the investigative and interrogatory stages of 
law enforcement activity, deceptive practices are part and parc,el of the 
enforcement enterprise. Even though there is some disagreement, 
both ethically and legally, about the extent to which deception may be 
employed, few question that it has a legitimate place in the enforce­
ment armamentarium. 
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But in the cases 1 have been outlining, we have an extension of this 
deception into the testimonial sphere - the making of unttuthful or 
deceptive statements to the court. And here, from my reading of the 
literature, we are playing a completely different ball-game. Police 
officers who publicly defend the use of some deception at the inves­
tigative and interrogatory stages of law enforcement, will sttongly 
denounce its use at the testimonial stage. Indeed, they will generally 
deny that it occurs. Such denials are not easy to contest. On the one 
hand, there is practically no support in the literature for testimonial. 
deception: it is almost universally condemned along with other forms 
of perjury.7 And so there is little incentive to admit to its occurrence. 
On the other hand, the relatively closed social environment of police 
work makes it very difficult for researchers to obtain data regarding 
such deception. Police tend to be sensitive about outside scrutiny, and 
so it is difficult to make claims about testimonial deception without 
running into problems of evidence. 
Yet from my own dealings with police, and in the opinion of lawy­
ers and judges to whom I have spoken, borne out to some extent by 
the statistical evidence, testimonial deception on the part of investigat­
ing officers does occur and, what is more, is often felt by the prosecu­
tion team or officers concerned to be justified by the circumstances of 
the case.8 The defendant ris almost certainly guilty, and it is believed 
that a conviction should not be undermined by a "procedural" 
impediment. 
I find this state of affairs very unsatisfactory. It is unsatisfactory not 
only to defendants, but also to the police themselves, whose sense of 
alienation from the community can only be increased by the situation. 
Either testimonial deception is unjustified, and police and prosecutiion 
should be persuaded to that position , or it is sometimes justified, and 
needs to be socially recognized and properly circumscribed. The pre­
vailing "code of silence" prevents the issue from being openly 
debated, and inhibits the institution of any remedies that may be 
called for. 
III 
My purpose in this paper, then, is to see what sort of case can be 
made for limited testimonial deception. I begin by attempting to flesh 
out the private belief that many police and prosecuting officers have 
that they are sometimes justified in deceiving the court. 
There are several reasons why police officers may be tempted to 
mislead the court, though only some of these could plausibly qualify 
as providing the basis for a justification. It is a sad fact that police par .. 
ticipants in the trial process are occasionally venal. For self-serving or 
other equally unpersuasive reasons they are prepared to vacate their 
formal commitments. Or maybe they wish to cover up their incompe-
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tence or to avoid self,incrimination. My concern is. not with these 
forms of dereliction. Nor am I concerned with the moral dilemma 
which ariiscs when police are called to testify against other officers. 
The bonds of loyalty between police are intense and important, and 
psychological inhibitions against "ratting" are considerable . .J 
The sorts of cases on which I want to focus are those in which plain 
truthtelling will jeopardize the processes of justice. I have in mind 
situations in which there is little doubt char the def end ants have 
committed the offenses with which they have been charged, but where 
the pre,arraignment investigation has been "procedurally" deficient 
because of v.iolations of the defendants' Fourth or Fifth Amendment 
rights. Where these defects have been more or less necessitated by the 
demands. of apprehension, but would be ''exploited'' by "sharp'' 
defending lawyers or viewed unsympathetically by judges, the investi, 
gating officers might feel that the community,supported cause of law 
enforcement, indeed of justice, requires that testimony be presented 
in such a way that " procedural" deficiencies are concealed. 
There :are various considerations that might be taken to reinforce 
the case for deception in these cases. One of the great frustrations of 
police - or any - worlc is to have an undertaking in which one has 
invested a great deal of energy come to nought. I don't mean simply a 
failure to turn up an offender or to secure evidence, but the more gal, 
ling frustration that arises when both offender and evidence have been 
secured, but conviction is subverted because of what is seen ,jn the 
circumstances , as a technicality. Frustrations of this kind can have a 
significant effect on job satisfaction, morale, and ultimately on the 
health of the law enforcement system. True, the police reward-system 
is based on arrests rather than convictions, and some officers are able 
to detach their investigative activity from its ultimate disposition in 
the courts - since they can take satisfaction in the fact that they have 
udone their part"10 - but many find the nullification of their work 
dispiriting and believe that it contributes to the disrepute from which 
they sometimes feel their profession unjustly suffers. 
The feeling that deception is justified may be intensified by the con, 
troversiality of the rules that threaten to undermine the prosecution 
case. The exclusionary sanction mandated by Mapp and the rights 
protected by Miranda have been topics of heated discussion ever since 
they were introduced. Many on the side of "law and order" have seen 
them as criminally inspired and subversive of effective law enforce .. 
ment.1 1  Police investigators generally feel sympathetic to such views, 
and, partly for that reason, may believe that circumspect dissembling 
with respect to their compliance would be supported by a substantial 
body of public opinion. 
The situation faced by police is not one in which some abstract jus­
tice is being pursued, but one in which a just result is sought in cir­
cumstances where there is every reason to believe that defendants are 
guilty of the offenses charged. The targets of their deception are often 
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themselves deceivers and. it is felt. deserve no better from others. To 
use deception against them is only to play according to rules they 
themselves have set. In seeking to deceive the community and its 
officers. they have forfeite-d the right to tTuthfulness. Taking into 
account. then, the "victims" of their deception, police may not feel 
coo much compunction if their testimony is "tidied up" to mtt-t con­
stitutional req uirements. Remember, we are not talking about the fab­
rication of evidence against innocent people, but those whom the 
police have every reason to believe to be guilty, and, moreover, usu­
ally those with a history of law-breaking. 12 
Not that it is solely a matter of reciprocation, of deceiving deceiv .. 
ers. There are in addition important social benefits to be gained. Not 
only do recalcittant criminals get what they deserve, but their convic­
tion and punishment is socially beneficial. The securing of an 
uordered liberty" requires that those who breach the community's 
rules with impunity not benefit from it. Their conviction may func­
tion to deter and prevent other violations of law. 
We may bu mess this appeal to the social advantages of testimonial 
deception by looking more generally at the limited character of the 
moral injunction against lying. Put in its sttongest terms, the funda­
mental problem with deceiving others is that in doing so we manipu­
late them. We seek to bend their beliefs and behavior to ends of our 
own devising by withholding from them information that would ena­
ble them to come to rational conclusions and to make rational deci­
sions of their own. In deceiving them, we deny them the dignity of 
rational choosers, people not only capable of assessing evidence, but 
also entitled to assess it for themselves. Deception, then, is no light 
matter. Nevertheless, very few of us would go so far as to eschew all 
deception. It is not absolutely impermissible.There are other social 
values besides that of truthtelling, and sometimes those values may 
weigh so heavily, and the untoward consequences of a particular 
instance of deception may weigh so lightly, that some deception will 
be considered justifiable. Indeed, we have even accommodated some 
of these occasions into our language via the notion of a .. white lie.,, 
And given that we already recognize circumstances in which the moral 
costs of deception may be traded for interpersonal and social benefits, 
why should we not also include within the ambit of legitimate excep­
tions occasional recourse to testimonial deception? 
Let this suffice for the beginnings of a case that attempts to give 
some moral standing to the limited use of testimonial deception. I 
present it as an effort to articulate what I perceive as a submerged and 
unwillingly confessed sense that it is sometimes right to 0tailor" evi­
dence so that it conforms to legal requirements more adequately. 
But before I assess its merits, I want to qualify it in one respect. For 
convenience I have focused almost exclusively on the individual polke 
officer and the justificatory reasons he or she might have for engaging 
in testimonial deception. But it would be wrong to see this pheno-
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menon individualistically. Police officers easily reflect the ethos of 
their worlc situation, and the likelihood of their engaging in testimon­
ial deception will significantly increase if there is peer group or agency 
support for or acquiescence in limited testimonial deception. In addi­
tion, some "aggressive" prosecutor's offices exert their own pressure 
on police to present their testimony in a constitutionally rigorous 
form, even if this means its "dressing up." 
IV 
I now wan� to indicate some difficulties with which an argument of 
this kind, for all its cumulative appeal, must come to terms. First of 
all, there is the underlying temptation to consider testimonial decep­
tion a relatively unproblematic extension of deception that is permit­
ted and permissible at earlier stages of the law enforcement process. 
Indeed, what is considered artificial and problematic is the attempt to 
rule out deception at the later stage. As Jerome Skolnick expresses the 
point, it is thought odd that 
the law permits the policeman to lie at the investiga­
tive stage, when he is not entirely convinced that the 
suspect is a criminal, but forbids lying about proce­
dures at the testimonial stage, when the policeman is 
certain of the accused's guilt.13 
However, whatever the ps-ycholog ical incentive to do so, there are moral 
obstacles to arguing from the limited permissibility of deception at the 
investigative and interrogatory stages of the law enforcement process 
to its equally or slightly more limited permissibility at the testimonial 
stage. 
Skolnick registers the difficulty by speaking of each stage of the 
udetecting process" being urelated to a set of increasingly stringent 
normative constraints. "14 His point, I take it, is roughly this. During 
the initial stage of investigation suspects are subject to few constraints. 
There is little external pressure on guilty suspects to confess or to 
betray their guilt. Indeed, it is most likely that they will be engaged in 
a contest of stealth so as to avoid detection. The situation can be 
likened to a "state of nature" in which something like the "law of the 
jungle" operates, and cunning is paramount. Here, deception, insofar 
as it is likely to trap the unwary criminal rather than to entrap the 
unwary innocent,15 has much to be said for it.16 At the interrogatory 
stage, however, particularly where the suspect is in custody, the situa, 
tion has been weighted in favor of the investigating officers. To ensure 
that the suspect's rights are not breached and that any statements 
made are voluntarily tendered, deception must be used much more 
cautiously. The consttaints are even greater at the testimonial stage; 
where the government can draw on all its resources. Here, the adver, 
sarial system serves to preserve the suspect's rights by providing for 
the accusing and defending parties to present before an impartial fact ... 
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finder the strongest possible cases for their contentions. constrained 
by systemic rules designed to ensure equality of opportunity between 
the contenders and optimal conditions for fact-finding. Among those 
rules is the requirement thar those who testify " tell the truth. the 
whole truth. and nothing but the truth ." The police officer who 
deceives at this stage of proceedings deceives not the suspect but the 
court. 
There is, therefore, no simple inference to be drawn from what is 
permissible at one stage to what is permissible at another. Further­
more. at the testimonial stage the public commitment to equality and 
justice seems to demand something approaching an absolute commit­
ment to truthfulness. 
Lest it be thought that those very purposes of justice would be bet­
ter served by testimonial deception, at least in the sorts of cases that 
we're discussing, we should add two further considerations. First, the 
requirement of testimonial truthfulness is to be assessed, not just on a 
case by case basis, but also as an ongoing practice. Even though, in 
individual cases, just outcomes may be secured only if search and 
seizure or Miranda requirements are compromised, and the courts are 
deceived about their fulfillment, the practice of permitting deception 
where conviction of an alleged offender seems to require it would 
almost certainly be counterproductive. It would undermine our con­
fidence in the adversarial system's ability to optimize fair outcomes. 
Justice in the short-term would be achieved at the expense of minimal 
long-term injus1tice. The prohibition on perjury may allow some 
offenders to slip through the net, but the net will be much less likely 
to hold the innocent. This connects with the second point. The so­
called "procedural" rules or " technicalities" which threaten the police 
case, and are used to exclude damaging evidence or testimony, are 
meant to protect substantive moral requirements. They pick out pro­
tocols designed to safeguard the moral minima governing the interper­
sonal dealings of citizens in a free society. It is out of concern for the 
human rights of suspects - the rights of those who are only suspected 
of committing an offense - that the exclusionary rules have been 
introduced. So, though justice at one level may sometimes be secured 
by testimonial deception in regard to the satisfaction of Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment requirements, this will involve its compromise at 
another level. Granted, the Mapp and Miranda requirements may, 
because of the particular circumstances involved, provide an excessive 
shield for criminal activity. But on the principle that reasons of public 
good do not justify the violation of rights, governments may have to 
be content with collecting less evidence, physical and oral, than their 
resources enable, or, if collected, with securing fewer convictions than 
the evidence warrants. 
A recognition that police officers who engage in testimonial decep­
tion deceive the court rather than the suspect also provides a partial 
response to the claim that lying suspects deserve no better. Even if 
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that were to be so, the court - as a social ins trument -deserves better. 
The adversarial system is a socially sanctioned means for testing alle­
gation.$ within a framework responsive to the rights of interested par­
ties, and those who flout its rules set themselves above one of our 
society's key institutions. 
But quite apart from this, it is less than obvious that liars may 
themselves be lied to. No doubt liars place themselves in something of 
an invidious moral position if they complain about others deceiving 
them. It will smack of rank hypocrisy for them to do so. But this is 
far from allowing that others are thereby justified in lying to them. 
Liars may deserve to have their liberties circumscribed in certain 
ways, but lying may not be an appropriate way. One of the strong 
points of the adversarial system is its recognition of the standing of 
accused persons - their entitlement, as responsible beings, to be tested 
by means that acknowledge personhood, that do not sacrifice them to 
abstract or social ends. Perhaps the accused has acted unworthily and 
warrants our retributive response. But responding by lying constitutes 
a repetition rather than a rectification of the wrong that prompted it. 
The moral defections of others provide no justification for one's own. 
However, as I indicated earlier, deception need not always be 
wrong, and we sometimes justify lying by reference to the evils i.t will 
avoid. And so what may be seen as the evil of allowing a guilty person 
to go free is used to justify testimonial deception. It is not that sus, 
pects are deserving of deception by virtue of their deception, but that 
their deception is justified because by their deception they attempt to 
conceal their deservingness of punishment. Certainly we use an argu, 
ment of this kind at earlier stages of the investigative process. It is 
tempting to use it also at the testimonia� stage. 
This, however, returns us to our earlier point about the capacity of 
the adversarial system to accommodate deception. We are, of course, 
assuming that the suspect is guilty, and perhaps in the cases outlined 
that is highly likely But in making this assumption we are taking a 
somewhat privileged position. Other parties in the law enforcement 
process may have their own perceptions about the facts of the case, 
and if police may deceive when it helps to secure endorsement of 
what they or the prosecution perceive to be the facts of the matter, 
that permission can hardly be withheld from the defense. The trouble 
is, once permitted at this stage of proceedings, there is very little con, 
trol over its use. The very nature of the activity , its secrecy , puts it 
beyond easy surveillance, and unlike deception used at the investiga, 
tive and interrogatory stages, whose legitimacy may be tested in court, 
where, at the point of closure - the court , deception is permitted, it is 
not open to scrutiny. As I stated earlier, it is crucial that before the 
impartial fact-finder, the adversaries be pledged to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth. 
However, this still leaves us with the problem of police frustration , 
the aggravation of seeing undoubted offenders avoid the judgment of 
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law. One response is simply to deny the relevance of JX>lice frustra­
tion - to say, if you like, that if police cannot do their job well enough 
to secure convictions, that is no reason for cooking the books. A 
more sympathetic response is to suggest that police may set their 
sights too high: their task is to apprehend suspects, not to convict. 
For them, it is arrests and not convictions that should count. Convic­
tion is the business of the court. Yet neither of these responses is 
likely to be completely satisfying. For one thing, the public expects 
more, and if the police and prosecution cannot make a case that holds 
up in court, the police are seen as failing to do their homework 
properly. 
But there is something else as well. I have been assuming that the 
adversarial system is in reasonable working order, and that when cases 
come to court, the odds are fairly clearly in favor of a just outcome. I 
suspect that many, including some police officers, would be cynical 
about that assumption. The adversarial system, fine in conception, is 
se·en by them to be unsatisfactory in practice. For the major partici­
pants, justice is the name, but winning is the game. Contending law­
yers are not embarked on holding before the fact-finder the most 
favorable construction of their client's case, so that the fact-finder 
may be in a position to make an impartial assessment based on all the 
relevant data. Instead, they are verbal gladiators, determined to out­
flank and subdue their opposition, exploiting rather than abiding by 
the rules of combat. My impression from talking to police officers is 
that they have little respect for lawyers, and sometimes for judges, and 
that this is often mutual. The police officer in court is in alien terri­
tory, where some are out to "geC-' him, and his obligations to the 
court are qualified. In these circumstances, testimonial deception may 
not always seem out of place. It constitutes a strategic move in a game 
where the pace is fast and the stakes are high. 
I do not want to claim that this presents a completely accurate pic­
ture of the adversarial system in practice. But I think it captures some­
thing that is widely believed, and that has some connection to real-
ity . 17  And if that is the case, might we not see testimonial deception as 
a rectifying strategy, an attempt to restore the adversarial system to its 
role as a medium of justice? We might even liken testimonial decep­
tion to a form of civil disobedience, a protest against a system that is 
failing to deliver what it promises. 
But if this is what testimonial deception is all about, I think it fails 
to make good its claims. If the adversarial system is flawed in practice, 
those flaws are not eliminated or rectified by adding a further source 
of error. True, deficiencies may sometimes be counterbalanced in the 
instant, but the overall structure for fact-finding will be weakened. At 
best, testimonial deception represents an ad hoe and dangerous stra­
tegy for securing just outcomes. At worst, it makes a mockery of the 
system. 
Further, though police officers may sometimes construe what 
10
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they're doing as a protest against a flawed system, the· very secrecy of 
their activiity distinguishes it from the standard case of civil disobe· 
dience. The protest is in no sense a public one. Indeed, publicly, 
police resolutely deny that they engage ini testimonial deception. 
In arguing against testimonial deception in this way, I do not want 
to be seen as taking an absolutist position. A legal system may become 
so corrupted in its operation, or the acquittal of a dangerous felon 
may pose such serious social danger, that testimonial deception 
becomes a serious option. But such cases, at least in our own society, 
are few and far between, and testimonial deception is more likely to 
be corrupting than correcting. 
It is the secrecy of testimonial deception that is at the heart of the 
problem. If it is the shared opinion of police officers that the adver· 
sarial system has become, if not a charade, then a somewhat unruly 
ballgame, and that deception is the only way to play, then this is 
something that they need to bring forcefully to the attention of a pub­
lic that expects them to "deliver." That they can hardly do if the pres· 
sures for and incidence of testimonial deception are underplayed or 
denied. And if the exclusionary and Miranda rules make unrealistic 
demands of law enforcement officers, crippling their investigative 
work, then a public which has supported those rules needs to be made 
aware of the costs it must pay to keep them in place. It may be pre· 
pared to pay those costs. But if it is not, then it should enter into dia· 
logue with the police about suitable modifications or alternatives. 
That discussion cannot take place as long as police continue to engage 
in testimonial deception, and then seek to deceive the public about its 
occurrence.18 
Notes 
1 Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 ( 1961 ). 
1 Miranda v. Aritona. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.Zd 694 ( 1966). 
1 Comment, "Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search·and·Scizure Practices �n 
Narcotics Cases," Columbia Journal of Law and Social Probkms, IV, 1 March, 
1968), 87·104; Sarah Barlow, "Patterns of Arrest for Misdemeanor Narcotics 
Possession: Manhattan Police Practices 1960.62," Criminal Law Bulletin, IV, 1 0  
(December, 1968), 549.82; Comment Narcotics "Police Perjury in, 'Dropsy' 
Cases: A Credibility Gap," Georgetown Law Journal, LX 2 (November, 1971 ), 
507·23.  
4 Apparently some police officers have attempted to explain the discrepancy in 
terms of a change in the behavior of narcotics possessors: 
A person in possession of narcotics w:ho secs a policeman approaching 
has a dilemma that grows out of the exclusionary rule. If the officer has a 
warrant for his arrest, the narcotics will be discovered and usable as evi· 
dence unless he can discard them. If the officer has no warrant, the per· 
son should retain the narcotics since any search necessary to discover 
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them �'ill probably be iU�I and the uclusionary rule will ptt\•cnt �ir 
use m �idcn«. Knowing the difftculty that an unctt0in possessor will 
h.avc in resolving this dikmma, a police officer without a ,.,>arrant may 
rush a susp«i. hoping to produce a panic in '-''hich the person "'ill \risibly 
discard the narcotics and gi� the officer cause to arrnt him and a legiti­
mate gTound to use this cvidcnc�. 
(Cited in Dallin H. Oah. "Studying the Exclusionary Ruic in Search and Sei.:­
ure," UnaieTnl) of Clucago La"· Rn�" XXXVll. 4 (Sum�r. 1970). 699-700.) 
It lS �. as Oaks points out (p. 740). th.at the Columbia study cited above 
assumes th.at wh.at counts for the diffttcnccs is a change in police bd\avior rathtt 
th.an that of n.arcotics possessors.. and a cattful inVC"Stiprion should have tested 
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